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Resignation syndrome (RS) designates a long-standing disorder predominately affecting
psychologically traumatized children and adolescents in the midst of a strenuous and
lengthy migration process. Typically a depressive onset is followed by gradual withdrawal
progressing via stupor into a state that prompts tube feeding and is characterized by
failure to respond even to painful stimuli. The patient is seemingly unconscious. Recovery
ensues within months to years and is claimed to be dependent on the restoration of hope
to the family. Descriptions of disorders resembling RS can be found in the literature and
the condition is unlikely novel. Nevertheless, the magnitude and geographical distribution
stand out. Several hundred cases have been reported exclusively in Sweden in the past
decade prompting the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare to recognize RS as
a separate diagnostic entity. The currently prevailing stress hypothesis fails to account for
the regional distribution and contributes little to treatment. Consequently, a re-evaluation
of diagnostics and treatment is required. Psychogenic catatonia is proposed to
supply the best fit with the clinical presentation. Treatment response, altered brain
metabolism or preserved awareness would support this hypothesis. Epidemiological
data suggests culture-bound beliefs and expectations to generate and direct symptom
expression and we argue that culture-bound psychogenesis can accommodate the
endemic distribution. Last, we review recent models of predictive coding indicating
how expectation processes are crucially involved in the placebo and nocebo effect,
delusions and conversion disorders. Building on this theoretical framework we propose a
neurobiological model of RS in which the impact of overwhelming negative expectations
are directly causative of the down-regulation of higher order and lower order behavioral
systems in particularly vulnerable individuals.
Keywords: catatonia, migration, culture-bound syndrom, pervasive refusal, psychogenic, apathy, hopelessness,
predictive coding
INTRODUCTION
In Sweden, apathy has been the colloquial term for a condition characterized by global and severe
loss of function affecting children and adolescents seeking asylum or undergoing migration
process. Typically prodromal anxiousness and depressive symptoms, in particular lethargy,
progresses into stupor and finally complete lack of any response behavior even to painful stimulus.
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At this stage patients are seemingly unconscious and tube
feeding life sustaining. After months to years remission
ensues with gradual return to what appears to be normal
function.
From January 1st 2003 to April 31st 2005, 424 cases were
reported (Hessle and Ahmadi, 2006) and out of the 6547 asylum
applications submitted for children (0–17 years) in Sweden
in 2004 (Von Folsach and Montgomery, 2006), 2.8% were
thus diagnosed. No cases reported from other countries, the
phenomenon appears unique to Sweden.
The nature and prevalence of the condition has been
subject to intense public debate. Malingering or Munchausen
syndrome by proxy has been proposed. Opposing views have
labelled these hypotheses xenophobic and instead suggested
the migratory process, purportedly unpredictable and long,
to precipitate the putatively stress-induced condition affecting
traumatized individuals. An asserted ‘‘questioning attitude’’,
in particular within the health care system, it has been
claimed, may constitute a ‘‘perpetuating retraumatization
possibly explaining the endemic’’ distribution (Bodegård,
2014).
An official inquiry (Hessle and Ahmadi, 2006) and an expert
committee (Rydelius, 2006) have both proposed multifactorial
explanatory models involving individual vulnerability,
traumatization, migration, culturally conditioned reaction
patterns and parental dysfunction or pathological adaption
to a caregiver’s expectations to interplay in pathogenesis.
Severe depression or conversion/dissociation disorder has been
suggested (Rydelius, 2006) andmalingering or factitious disorder
remain unsupported (Aronsson et al., 2009).
January 1st 2014, the Swedish National Board of Health
and Welfare recognized the novel diagnostic entity resignation
syndrome (RS; Socialstyrelsen, 2013). Implying a psychological
etiology, its appropriateness remains to be demonstrated. In
this presentation, the term will be used; however, should be
interpreted free from theory.
As of today, diagnostic criteria are undetermined,
pathogenesis uncertain and the regional distribution
unexplained. New cases are presenting, 22 in the Stockholm area
in 2014 (Schiller, 2015, Personal Communication), and effective
treatment is lacking.
In this article we address three questions in relation to RS:
What is it? Why is it locally distributed? And how can it
arise? First we summarize and analyze the literature on RS.
Then we argue: (1) that RS should be perceived as catatonia, a
hypothesis readily testable by either neuroimaging or evaluation
of treatment response; (2) that culturally transmitted and
sanctioned beliefs may, through psychogenesis, account for
the regional distribution; and (3) on a mechanistic level, that
cultural and contextual influence may fundamentally change
expectations and priors on the bodily functions inducing failure
to activate both higher order and lower order behaviors in
vulnerable individuals. To support this claim we frame it in a
predictive coding context that has been suggested to be causally
involved in placebo and nocebo effects, delusions and conversion
disorders.
BACKGROUND
Clinical Observations and Treatment
In a material of 23 patients, Bodegård (2005b) described
the typical patient as ‘‘totally passive, immobile, lacks tonus,
withdrawn, mute, unable to eat and drink, incontinent and
not reacting to physical stimuli or pain’’. He further noted
that ‘‘[p]eriods of panicky refusal and/or anxiety can proceed
or intervene with the stuporous state’’ and that ‘‘[s]econdary
symptoms may appear, such as tachycardia, rise in temperature,
weight gain, oedema, profuse sweating, reactivation (?) of latent
viral infection, skin ulcers and muscular atrophy’’ (Bodegård,
2005b). Later reports and current observations find less evidence
of ‘‘panicky refusal’’ and ‘‘secondary symptoms’’. The persisting
impression is that of symptoms progressing on a continuum
from introversion and lethargy to stupor, lack of response and
seeming unconsciousness.
Typically, non-negotiable symptoms, such as inability to
ingest, elicit contact with the health care system. Sometimes a
possible trigger incident, such as a negative asylum decision,
can be identified. Patients may be admitted after a few
days marked by rapid deterioration and stupor. On other
occasions a more gradual presentation of anxiety, dysphoria,
sleeping disturbances, social withdrawal and other symptoms
are subsequently supplemented by mutism, failure to participate
in activities such as school and play, failure to communicate
altogether, and finally, to initiate motor activity and respond
to stimulus leaving the patient in a supine position seemingly
unconscious and generally with eyes closed (for clinical
characteristics, see Box 1). At this stage, RS prompts tube
feeding and full ADL-support (Bodegård, 2005b; Aronsson
et al., 2009; Ascher and Hjern, 2013; Forslund and Johansson,
2013).
Routine work-up includes toxic screening and anamnestic
interviewing via interpreter. Neuroradiology, neurophysiological
examinations and lumbar puncture are considered optional
(Socialstyrelsen, 2013). Electroencephalogram (EEG) and
computed tomography of the skull have generally been
unimpressive as well as laboratory screenings (Bodegård,
2004; Aronsson et al., 2009; Forslund and Johansson, 2013).
Magnetic resonance tomography (MRT) is recommended
(Rydelius, 2006) however, rarely performed.
Once stabilized, somatic illness excluded and the parent(s)
comfortable administering tube feeding, the patient is discharged
and subsequent treatment given in a home setting with regular
ambulatory visits to the clinic. In previous years long-term
hospitalization was common and there is still a lacking consensus
regarding level of care (Lindberg and Sundelin, 2005). Although
Bodegård (2006) finds support for hospitalization in one report
out-patient care aiming for family involvement is presently the
preferred model.
Apart from life-sustaining tube feeding, treatment amounts to
promoting and maintaining a secure and hopeful environment,
encouraging a sense of coherence. Several authors stress the
importance of a permanent residency permit (PRP; Lindberg and
Sundelin, 2005; Ascher and Gustavsson, 2008) although a permit
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BOX 1 | Clinical characteristics of RS.
Prodromal
Anxiety
Dysphoria
Sleeping disturbances
Social withdrawal
Deterioration
Mutism
Failure to participate in activities
Failure in non verbal communication
Fully developed
Stupor
Unresponsiveness/negativism
Immobility
Incontinence
No reaction to pain stimulus including reflex
Dependent on tube-feeding and full ADL assistance
Tachycardia
Elevated temperature
Occasional profuse sweating
Occasional hyperventilation
Muscular atrophy
Periods of excitability, anxiety, “refusal”
Generally normal routine neurologic examination
Hypotonicity (sometimes coded as flaccid paralysis)
Reflexes generally responding but weak
Eyes open or closed not permitting passive opening
Pupils reactive to light and occasionally responsive to threat
Eyes divert from examiner and appear unseeing
Jerks
Indications of preserved awareness
Electroencephalogram (EEG), CT of skull and brain, laboratory sampling
including toxicology all unimpressive
Remission
Generally in an ordered pattern (hand squeeze or eye opening without eye
contact; eye contact; nodding and active partaking in feeding; gross motor
skills; fine motor skills; verbal communication)
Indications of varying degrees of amnesia
Full recovery without remaining symptoms or deficits
Based on own experience and reports (Bodegård, 2005b; Aronsson et al.,
2009; Ascher and Hjern, 2013; Forslund and Johansson, 2013).
in itself neither is sufficient for remission nor precludes debut
(Bodegård, 2006). Alongside care given by the family, nurses,
psychologists, physiotherapists and occupational therapists are
responsible for day-to-day care. A pediatrician and a child
and adolescent psychiatrist are involved at regular intervals.
One center employed individualized sense stimulation (Forslund
and Johansson, 2013). No reports of successful pharmacological
treatment, including antidepressants, or attempted electro-
convulsive therapy (ECT) exist.
The duration of tube-feeding ranges from months to years. In
one study (n = 29) themean duration was 10, 6 months (1.1–24.5;
Aronsson et al., 2009) and in another, inpatient study (n = 5),
27 weeks (10–60; Forslund and Johansson, 2013). Bodegård
(2006) (n = 25) reports duration of tube feeding to covariate,
in particular, with level of care (in favor of hospitalization);
however, also with time elapsed between hospitalization and PRP
being granted.
One study (n = 29) described remission following a similarly
ordered pattern in 22 patients; hand squeeze or eye opening
without eye contact was followed by eye contact, nodding and
active partaking in feeding, return of gross motor skills, return
of fine motor skills and verbal communication (Aronsson et al.,
2009).
One survey (n = 5) report full recovery 1–8 years after
discharge (Forslund and Johansson, 2013). At present, in relation
to available data, the generally held assumption of ‘‘full recovery’’
remains poorly supported.
Epidemiology
The patient group as hitherto described comprises of children
and adolescents 7–19 years of age (mean 14.3) with 2:3
female predominance (Bodegård, 2004; Aronsson et al., 2009;
Söndergaard et al., 2012; Forslund and Johansson, 2013). All
described cases are refugees often belonging to a political
or ethnic minority (Bodegård, 2005a, 2014; Forslund and
Johansson, 2013). A disproportionally large share of patients
originate from former Soviet republics or former Yugoslavia
(Von Folsach andMontgomery, 2006) but cases fromBangladesh
and Africa have been reported (Lindberg and Sundelin, 2005).
The Uighur ethnic group is reported to be overrepresented
among those affected (Rydelius, 2006). Traumatization in terms
of physical abuse, harassment or by witnessing violence and
abuse in the close family, is prevalent in half to all affected
individuals (Bodegård, 2005b; Godani et al., 2008; Aronsson
et al., 2009; Forslund and Johansson, 2013). Purported pre-
morbid personality traits such as conscientiousness and high
achieving have been reported (Forslund and Johansson, 2013).
To our knowledge, no cases have been established outside
of Sweden. An accurate estimate of the total number of cases
is challenging due to varying quality in reported materials.
In 2002, 65 cases were reported and in 2004, 130. A
national effort in 2003–2005 recognized 424 cases. In 2006 a
temporary refugee amnesty easing asylum approval was enforced
and later considered to contribute to a subsequent decrease
(Socialstyrelsen, 2013). In 2005–2007, 70 patients were included
in the rehabilitation programme in the Stockholm area alone
(Aronsson et al., 2009), in 2013, 15 and in 2014, 22 (Schiller,
2015, Personal Communication). The prevalence as stated by the
national effort 2003–2005 probably represents an exaggeration
(Billing, 2014, Personal Communication). In an official inquiry
from 2006 extensive interviewing, register inventories and field
studies conducted in relevant countries and regions yielded no
information of reaction patterns, nor of circumstances, such as
cultural peculiarities, that could account for the phenomenon
(Hessle and Ahmadi, 2006).
Apathy
In relation to the epidemiological data it is not entirely
unreasonable to at least speculate in a novel pathogenic entity.
However, historic accounts of similar symptom panoramas exist
arguably precluding this interpretation.
In 1913, Jaspers characterized apathy: ‘‘[t]his is the term
given to absence of feeling’’ where ‘‘there is no incentive to act’’
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BOX 2 | “Apathy” according to Jaspers (1913/1993).
“This is the term given to absence of feeling. If this absence is complete, as can
happen in acute psychoses, the patient is fully conscious and oriented, sees,
hears, observes and remembers, but he lets everything pass him by with the
same total indifference; happiness, pleasure, something positive in which he is
involved, danger, sorrow, annihilation are all the same. He remains “dead with
wakeful eyes”. In this condition there is no incentive to act; apathy brings about
aboulia. It seems as if that one aspect of psychic life we call object-awareness
has become isolated; there is only the mere grasp of reason on the world as
an object. We can compare it to a photographic plate. Reason can portray
its environment but cannot appreciate it. This absence of feeling shows itself
objectively in the patient not taking food, in a passive indifference to being hurt,
burnt, etc. The patient would die if we did not keep him alive with feeding and
nursing care. The apathy of these acute states must be distinguished from the
dullness of certain abnormal personalities who are constantly at the mercy of
innumerable feelings, only crude in quality.”
(Jaspers, 1913/1993)
manifested ‘‘objectively in the patient not taking food, in a passive
indifference to being hurt, burnt, etc. The patient would die if we
did not keep him alive with feeding and nursing care’’ (Jaspers,
1913/1993; see Box 2).
Children exhibiting lethargy and apathy with resemblance to
depressive stupor or catatonia in connexion to traumatic events
(Annell, 1958) and reaction patterns in catastrophes and war
involving reduced contact and ‘‘apathic introversion’’ along with
other symptoms interpreted to be psychosomatic (Otto, 1982),
have been described.
Numerous phenomena resembling RS have been reported
by physicians and anthropologists across contexts, cultures and
time periods suggesting a common psychosomatic mechanism
(Kihlbom, 2013). Acute as well as prolonged death ensuing real
or magical threat of death is known from cultures on most
continents (see e.g., Lester, 2009). ‘‘Epidemics’’ of dying in
war and captivity where no hope remains has been described
(Kihlbom, 2013). Nostalgia has been examined in relation
to deterioration, apathy and dying (Johannisson, 2001). The
concentration camp term ‘‘muselmann’’ denoted those void of
all hope exhibiting resignation behavior (Kertész, 1998) claimed
to sustain for weeks without nutrition in a state of ‘‘archaic
autohypnosis’’ (Kihlbom, 2013). Unexpected and unexplainable
sudden death following cancer diagnosis has been termed ‘‘self-
willed death’’ (Milton, 1973). Sudden nocturnal death in Hmong
immigrants in the USA (Adler, 1994) is hypothesized to result
from sleep paralysis-type panic attacks involving punishment by
spiritual encounter inspired by folk tales.
Resignation, apathy and eventually death in response to severe
unavoidable threat is a consistent finding throughout history and
across cultures.
Diagnostic Conceptualizations
A wide range of diagnostic alternatives have been considered;
various neurological disorders, anorexia nervosa, selective
mutism, school refusal, social phobia, other anxiety states,
states of conversion and dissociation, chronic fatigue syndrome,
depression, catatonic states, andmalingering. Among these none,
according to Bodegård (2005a), fully exhaust the clinical picture
including presentation, course and recovery. He therefore coined
the term Depressive Devitalization (DD) only to later argue the
condition, in its most severe form, to be identical to Pervasive
Refusal Syndrome (PRS; Bodegård, 2005b) as introduced by Lask
et al. (1991) and designating a child’s ‘‘dramatic social withdrawal
and determined refusal to walk, talk, eat, drink, or care for
themselves in any way’’.
The similarities and differences between DD and PRS have
been discussed (Von Folsach and Montgomery, 2006); PRS
involves active refusal, DD in all its forms does not, and further,
PRS does not manifest ‘‘flaccid paralysis and generalized sensory
loss’’, DD does. Accordingly, DD and PRS have been suggested to
be subgroups of ‘‘the same refusal syndrome’’ (Von Folsach and
Montgomery, 2006).
In a re-conceptualization of PRS, yet another term—Pervasive
Arousal-Withdrawal Syndrome (PAWS)—was introduced
together with an hypothesis of hyper-arousal in the sympathetic
and parasympathetic autonomic nervous systems resulting
in a ‘‘deadlock’’ manifesting itself in refusal, on this account
re-conceptualized as a combination of ‘‘extreme anxiety
avoidance’’ and ‘‘behavioral paralysis’’ mirroring the autonomic
responses respectively. The authors predict high energy
consumption as well as activity shifts in amygdala and insula to
be present (Nunn et al., 2014). Interestingly, indirect calorimetry
demonstrated energy expenditure below the requirement of
basal metabolism in two patients suggesting an equivalent of
hibernation (Jeppsson, 2013).
In contrast to the novel diagnostic entities such as DD, PRS
and PAWS stand accounts relying on established diagnoses.
Several authors discuss stress-induced conditions such as
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) yet refrain, due to lack of
diagnostic fit, from adopting these (Lindberg and Sundelin, 2005;
Söndergaard et al., 2012; Bodegård, 2014).
An expert committee (Rydelius, 2006) identified severe
depression or conversion/dissociation disorder to be the best
diagnostic alternatives. Engström (2013), a member of the
committee, argued traditional diagnostic entities sufficient in the
majority of cases. He recognized RS as severe major depressive
disorder with psychotic features specified as catatonic (DSM-IV
296.24), or in the ICD-10 taxonomy; as a severe depressive episode
with psychotic symptoms, in particular stupor (F32.3).
January 1st 2014 the Swedish National Board of Health
and Welfare, for epidemiological purposes, recognized RS
(uppgivenhetssyndrom, ICD-10 F32.3A) and the specifier problem
adhering to status as refugee and asylum seeking (Z65.8A).
From a diagnostic viewpoint the introduction has been
argued unnecessary (Engström, 2013). RS classified among
the depressive entities (F32–33) should be interpreted as
pragmatic solution to controversies regarding the nature of the
phenomenon (Socialstyrelsen, 2013). Diagnostic criteria remain
undetermined.
Etiological Conceptualizations
An expert committee suggested six etiological conceptualizations
(Rydelius, 2006). These included: (1) the medical model of
disorder according to which a disorder affects vulnerable
individuals under certain circumstances; (2) the family
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model stressing family psychology system theory; (3) the
psychological model emphasizing effects of uncontrollability;
(4) the political model identifying political decisions governing
the asylum process; (5) the cultural model proposing the
symptoms to instantiate a phenomenon belonging to either
the patients’ cultural, religious or existential descent or to
that of the country to which they migrate. Implicit in the
cultural model lays the notion of secondary illness gain;
and (6) according to the intended model an intentional
decision made by the family or by the child explains the
symptoms.
A Stress Hypothesis
Several authors endorse a stress hypothesis arguing a sustained
stress response to be, if not the explanation, at least a
contributing factor in pathogenesis (Lindberg and Sundelin,
2005; Söndergaard et al., 2012; Bodegård, 2014). Hypothetically,
a sufficient and sustained ‘‘discrepancy between what is expected
and what really exists’’ (Ursin and Eriksen, 2010) eliciting a stress
response could precipitate debut in individuals predisposed
by genetic, comorbid (depression, anxiety, neuropsychiatric
disorders), premorbid (personality traits or adverse life events)
or other unknown factors. Early symptoms accord with a stress
induced condition (Lindberg and Sundelin, 2005) and altered
autonomic function (tachycardia and rise in temperature) may
be interpreted in analogy. The impact of a PRP on remission
is taken to support the stress hypothesis and obtaining it is
therefore considered an essential element in treatment (Lindberg
and Sundelin, 2005).
Trauma and stressful events interplay with coping. This
conjunction in turn impact on risk and resilience with
regards to psychopathology (Ursin and Eriksen, 2010).
Relatedly, one RS report (n = 29) surveyed predisposing,
precipitating and perpetuating factors (Godani et al., 2008).
In the neonatal period, 15 children exhibited predisposing
factors associated with attachment (preterm birth, obstetric
or neonatal complications, malformations, severe infection,
congenital hip dysplasia etcetera). In the toddler period 25
had exhibited behavioral anomalies or had been subject to
stressors (migration, loss of primary carer, severe illness,
starvation, war, threat, death in family etcetera). Only a
few individuals failed to demonstrate predisposing factors
altogether. Putatively precipitating factors of either having
witnessed or been subject to traumatization by threat, violence,
rape or witnessing death, were demonstrated in all but one
child. Indications of perpetuating factors, such as insufficient
maternal care and ability to supply security, including previous
maternal psychiatric illness and traumatization by assault, rape,
murder of relative etcetera were, taken together, present in
the majority of cases. The fathers’ contribution could not be
studied due to insufficient data. Findings support predisposing
and perpetuating factors being of considerable importance.
Traumatization of mothers and children correlate inversely with
time spent in Sweden prior to debut and directly with length
of tube-feeding dependency (Godani et al., 2008). The material
was biased towards advanced cases, and controls were lacking
altogether.
In concordance with the stress hypothesis diminished
diurnal variation of cortisol measured in saliva has been
demonstrated, however in a small sample (n = 4; Godani et al.,
2008). In another study (n = 11), patterns of endogenous
steroids imply negative association of concentrations of cortisol
and cortisone, and positive association with pregnenolone,
17-hydroxypregnenolone and dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA)
with severity of symptoms and the time of recovery (Söndergaard
et al., 2012). No statistically significant difference in cortisol levels
at entry and after recovery was shown. Elevated levels of DHEA
and pregnenolone was demonstrated and suggested to support a
neurosteroid hypothesis of stress (Söndergaard et al., 2012).
The reported overrepresentation within the Uighur ethnic
group (Rydelius, 2006), it may be hypothesized, could result from
a predisposing genetic or epigenetic factor. However, no cases of
RS or similar phenomena were confirmed in the regions from
which the Uighurs migrate (Hessle and Ahmadi, 2006).
The stress hypothesis suggests the condition to be present
in comparable populations and in particular other refugee
populations. To our knowledge no such reports exist. Personal
communication with the child and adolescent psychiatrist Dr
Abdulbaghi Ahmad, founding director of Metin Health House, a
child mental health center in Duhok, Kurdistan, reveals no cases
in the Duhok refugee camps accommodating approximately
100,000 people of Syrian decent andmore than 600,000 internally
displaced people from Iraq, among which about 28% are
5–14 years of age. Dr Ahmad, with expertise in childhood
trauma, from Sweden and Kurdistan (Ahmad, 2008; Ahmad
et al., 2008), reports various stress-induced conditions in the
camps but none resembling RS. To account for the regional
distribution, the stress hypothesis would need an auxiliary
hypothesis.
A Psychodynamic Interpretation
A model implicating the mother’s predicament as the driving
force behind RS has been proposed (Bodegård, 2005a). Inspired
by the hypothesized mechanisms underpinning PRS (Nunn
and Thompson, 1996), Bodegård suggests a psychodynamic
interpretation.
The majority of mothers in Bodegård’s material had been
subject to physical and or sexual abuse (Bodegård, 2005a;
Godani et al., 2008) and were described as severely traumatized.
Their attitude was signified by a lack of trust, rejection of
medical information excluding physical illness as causing the
condition and resistance to rehabilitation and treatment on the
child’s behalf. On Bodegård’s interpretation, this attitude and
the corresponding behavior may be perceived as parts of a
coping strategy by which the mother’s traumatized depressed
situation and need for consolation is projected from herself
and onto her child. She creates a ‘‘delusive fantasy of the
child as dying’’ and the child acting to maintain the right to
be its mother’s child, a folie à deux implicating the idea of
a serious illness is staged. By ‘‘lethal mothering’’ the mother
unconsciously creates and maintains an alternative reality in
which she finds meaning in caring for a child imagined as dying
in turn affecting the child and promoting debut and progression
of the disorder.
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The situation can be related to a Munchausen by proxy
scenario in which the mother’s delusion, aimed at concealing
her own desperate situation by projecting it to the imagined
disorder of the child, distorts not only her reality but also that
of the child which in the process is abandoned and forced
into adapting the role of dying or, ‘‘devitalized’’. From the
child’s perspective the prospect of rejection by the mother
is more frightening (on a subconscious level) than adopting
the delusion which protects not only from rejection itself
but also from the emotional trauma of failing mothering. In
relation to this interplay the child’s deterioration, withdrawal,
stupor and finally, full blown DD, may be conceptualized
on a psychodynamic interpretation according to Bodegård
(2005a).
Other authors fail to report evidence of inadequate mothering
or disadvantageous maternal coping strategies. The hypothesis
would suggest the phenomenon to be present in comparable
populations. Such reports have failed to reach the research
community.
Interestingly, a notion of expectancy as a contributor in
pathogenesis is invoked. The staging of the child as dying and
it acting accordingly, would serve to illustrate how a propagated
set of beliefs may govern reaction patterns. Also, Bodegård’s
proposal involves a family system perspective attractive in
relation to the observation that, to our knowledge, RS in
unaccompanied minors have not been observed.
HYPOTHESES
In relation to the nature and regional distribution of RS neither
of the two examined hypotheses—the stress hypothesis and
the psychodynamic hypothesis—are sufficient. Both, although
possibly of importance, fail to account for the regional
distribution and predict the disorder to be present in populations
where it is not. We now proceed to argue that catatonia
satisfyingly fits the clinical characteristics of RS and that the
regional distribution can be explained by invoking a notion of
culture-bound psychogenesis.
RS is Catatonia
Rather than a lack of awareness, RS is characterized by an
inability to initiate motor response, a finding also present in
catatonia and conversion disorder. On the basis of substantial
clinical overlap, we argue that RS should be perceived as
catatonia. As catatonia promptly responds to a test dose of
lorazepam (or equivalent) and is validated by positive treatment
effect with benzodiazepines and/or ECT (Fink and Taylor, 2003);
and as neuroimaging may indicate altered brain activity in
catatonia (De Tiége et al., 2003), as well as preserved awareness
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010) the hypothesis is testable.
Arousal and Awareness in RS
At its most advanced stage RS patients appear unconscious.
The eyes of the patients are generally closed and remain
so despite stimulation. If passively opened eyes sometimes
diverge away from the examiner. Further, patients exhibit
(what has been interpreted as) flaccid paralysis or hypotonicity
and complete lack of pain response (sternal rub, supraorbital
pressure, nail-bed pressure) as well as reaction to extraction
or insertion of nasogastric tube. We are unaware of caloric
testing having been performed in order to determine
physiological nystagmus indicative of wakefulness. An
‘‘Amytal interview’’1 (Iserson, 1980; Posner et al., 2007) or
a benzodiazepine challenge2 (Fink and Taylor, 2003) has
to our knowledge not been exploited in order to reveal a
psychogenic state. Interestingly, however, Bodegård (2005a)
reports of two patients temporarily normalizing following
midazolam administration prior to insertion of a nasogastric
tube. Nevertheless, a condition lacking both arousal and
awareness is the general impression when examining RS
patients.
The general impression needs however be questioned. Sleep-
wake cycles are indicated by hypnagogic jerks and confirmed by
EEG-recordings (Bodegård, 2005a). Language acquisition in the
seemingly unaware state, tear excretion in otherwise detached
faces, self-report of inclination to console parents in despair
as well as of blurred visions including ‘‘fairies’’ all testify to
preserved awareness (Engström, 2013). Bodegård claims full
awareness (n = 5) during the course of the disorder and negates
amnesia (Bodegård, 2005a). Another study reports varying
degrees of amnesia (Forslund and Johansson, 2013).
According to these reports RS exhibits a combination of
inability to respond to any stimulation and maintained, perhaps
fluctuating, awareness, as well as preserved arousal. Neither
arousal nor awareness thus appear impaired to an extent
explaining the lack of response to painful stimulus. Accepting
this line of argument, the inability to initiate motor activity
would have to account for unresponsiveness, which indeed has
been proposed (Engström, 2013). On this interpretation, RS is
consistent with psychogenic unresponsiveness possibly on the
basis of catatonia or conversion disorder both known to generate
motor symptoms of either inhibitory or excitatory nature (Posner
et al., 2007).
Catatonia
Recently a considerable shift has occurred in the conception of
catatonia (Tandon et al., 2013). For a long period considered a
sub group within schizophrenia, in DSM-IV catatonia was partly
separated from this hierarchy by the addition of a new class;
Catatonia secondary to medical condition. Successful treatment
in catatonia exhibiting little or no effect in schizophrenia,
and catatonia occurring in relation to other psychiatric as
well as somatic disorders motivated the separation, which
in DSM-5 was finalized by the deletion of schizophrenia,
catatonic type altogether. Currently catatonia is conceived of
as a neuropsychiatric syndrome associated with systemic illness
(Fink, 2013; Fink et al., 2015).
In DSM-5, catatonia is defined as the presence of three
or more symptoms out of a list of twelve (Table 1). Among
1Under the slow intravenous injection of amobarbital, continuous
interviewing and evaluation of symptoms, patients with psychogenic
impairment of consciousness exhibit symptom relief.
2Amodern version of the Amytal interview in which lorazepam or diazepam
is used.
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TABLE 1 | Catatonia in DSM-5.
Catatonia is defined as the presence of three or more of the following:
1. Catalepsy Passive induction of a posture held against gravity
2. Waxy flexibility Slight and even resistance to positioning by examiner
3. Stupor No psychomotor activity; not actively relating to
environment
4. Agitation (Not influenced by external stimuli)
5. Mutism No, or very little, verbal response (not applicable if there is
an established aphasia)
6. Negativism Opposing or not responding to instructions or
external stimuli
7. Posturing Spontaneous and active maintenance of a posture against
gravity
8. Mannerisms Odd caricature of normal actions
9. Stereotypies Repetitive, abnormally frequent, non-goal directed
movements
10. Grimacing
11. Echolalia Mimicking another’s speech
12. Echopraxia Mimicking another’s movements
American Psychiatric Association (2013)
these, stupor, mutism and negativism are all general finding
in RS (Box 1). Diagnostic criteria apply regardless of age.
Nevertheless, pediatric catatonia has been suggested to consist
of three cardinal symptoms; immobility, mutism and withdrawal
or refusal to ingest (Takaoka and Takata, 2003). Depending on
clinical presentation, either the specifier with catatonia together
with major depressive disorder, or, the separate entity catatonic
disorder NOS (not otherwise specified; Tandon et al., 2013) would
be applicable to RS. From a phenomenological perspective,
applying these diagnostic labels should meet no resistance.
Posner et al. (2007) characterize catatonic stupor (as opposed
to the excited form): the patient’s eyes are usually open
apparently unseeing, or sometimes, tightly closed resisting
passive opening. Skin is pale and acne or oily skin common. Pulse
is rapid (90–120) and temperature often elevated (1.0–1.5◦C).
Spontaneous movement is rare and unawareness the impression.
Pupils are dilated and reactive to light, alternating anisochoria is
common and opticokinetic response present, however, patients’
may fail to blink to visual threat. Doll’s eye test is negative
and caloric testing produces normal ocular nystagmus. Increased
salivation is sometimes noted. Incontinence may be present.
Urinary retention may require catheterization. Extremities
are relaxed or rigid resisting passive movements. Catalepsy
(waxy muscular/postural rigidity and reduced responsiveness)
is present in 30%. Choreiform jerks of the extremities and
grimaces are common. Reflexes are normal. Consciousness
is preserved although the appearance is the opposite. On
recovering, the patient is often, but not always, able to
recall events that occurred during illness. Normal neurological
examination and self-reports after recovery attest preserved
consciousness.
Further, inability to speak despite urge to do so, as reported in
an RS patient (Engström, 2013), has been reported in Catatonia
(Fink, 2013) and after remission, catatonic patients recover fully
which appears to be the case also in RS patients (Forslund and
Johansson, 2013) although this finding need to be confirmed.
‘‘Panicky refusal’’ (Bodegård, 2005b) may be interpreted as
agitation, a common finding in the exited form of Catatonia
(Fink and Taylor, 2003).
Reviewing the symptoms of RS and catatonia, (Box 1, Table 1)
resemblance is undeniable. Clinical characteristics of RS match
the diagnostic criteria of catatonia. Dhossche et al. (2012) argue
pediatric catatonia to be the genuine diagnosis in both RS and
PRS and find evidence of deprivation, abuse and trauma to
precipitate catatonia in children and adolescents. Shorter (2012)
contests the prevailing belief that pediatric catatonia is a rare
disorder; other diagnostic labels have obscured the condition
(Table 2), which, prior to Kahlbaum coining the term in 1874,
was only natural. An extensive review of catatonia in all age
groups supports Shorter’s analysis (Fink, 2013). Cohen et al.
(1999), based on a literature review, report 42 cases of adolescent
catatonia among which 19 were associated with mood disorder.
Posner et al. (2007) suggest catatonic stupor to be rare due
to effective treatment. This is of course only applicable if the
condition is recognized and treated.
Demonstrating Catatonia
In acute catatonia, treatment effect verifies the diagnosis: prompt
response to a benzodiazepine challenge implies catatonia and
treatment effect with benzodiazepines and/or ECT validates the
diagnosis (Fink and Taylor, 2003). As already noted, Bodegård
(2005a) observed two patients temporarily normalizing in
response to midazolam. In acute catatonia, 60–90% responds
to lorazepam (Northoff, 2002; Fink and Taylor, 2003). Chronic
cases may fail to respond (Northoff, 2002). Amantadine may
have effect in these cases and ECT, considered the most potent
alternative, exhibits effect in 80–100% of all cases (Luchini et al.,
2015).
Pediatric catatonia is typically treated with benzodiazepines
and ECT (Dhossche et al., 2009; Weiss et al., 2012; Wachtel
et al., 2013). In a pediatric population ECT is considered
effective and safe. There are no studies indicating deleterious
side-effect and the fear of inflicting damage to the developing
brain finds no support (Wachtel et al., 2011). Interestingly, the
first five patients receiving treatment with convulsive therapy
in 1934 were stuporous and had required tube-feeding for
TABLE 2 | Diagnostic labels that have historically obscured Catatonia as
an independent disease according to Shorter (2012).
Pre 1850s Stupor
Catalepsy
Stupidité
Death spells
1869 Neurasthenia
Hysteria (dissociated from Catatonia in 1920s)
1871 Hebephrenia
1874 Catatonia
1899 Dementia praecox
1903 Psychasthenia
1908 Schizophrenia
1920s Encephalitis lethargica
1934 “Brain stem” changes (precursor to ADHD)
1943 Autism
1991 Pervasive refusal syndrome
2007 Anti-NMDA receptor encephalitis
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several months; repeated intramuscular injection of camphor
precipitating seziures were effective in all patients (Luchini et al.,
2015).
Posner et al. (2007) conceive of catatonia as psychogenic
unresponsiveness (which is not to say it is imagined).
In the clinical context, psychologically induced neurological
symptoms usually exhibit normal EEG andMRI findings (Posner
et al., 2007); however, using positron emission tomography
(PET) technology, regional metabolic abnormalities have been
demonstrated including reduced metabolism in the prefrontal
cortex (the anterior cingulate, the medial prefrontal and
dorsolateral cortices) in a 14 year old girl diagnosed with akinetic
catatonia in the context of Bipolar type 1 disorder (De Tiége et al.,
2003). Interestingly, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) lesions
are known to contribute to a range of behavioral disorders
including akinetic mutism, diminished self-awareness, impaired
motor initiation and reduced pain response (Devinsky et al.,
1995). Posner et al. (2007) predict abnormal brain metabolism
in psychogenic coma. Evaluation of prefrontal metabolism in RS
patients is an attractive, so far unexplored, diagnostic alternative.
Demonstrating Awareness in RS
If RS is catatonia, consciousness should be preserved. In
RS the general impression is that of a condition void of
arousal as well as awareness, which by definition implies
unconsciousness, yet indications of the opposite exist (Bodegård,
2005a; Engström, 2013). The unresponsive RS patient exhibiting
only that behavior, bedside tests are inadequate. A similar
situation faces the clinician examining patients suffering from
disorders of consciousness (DOC) where residual awareness may
be impossible to determine with traditional methods (Giacino
et al., 2009). However, through analysis of brain resting state
activity a further means of discriminating between the unaware
and aware patient has been made possible (Owen et al., 2006;
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010; Evers and Sigman, 2013).
Aberrant activity in the default mode network (DMN) has
been demonstrated to correlate with a number of psychiatric and
neurological disorders (Zhang and Raichle, 2010) as well as with
physiological and induced variations in level of consciousness
(Heine et al., 2012). Importantly, the level of consciousness
in patients suffering from DOC have been described vis-à-vis
activity in the DMN: functional as well as structural connectivity,
established by exploiting fMRI BOLD-signal and diffusion
tensor imaging (DTI) respectively, have been demonstrated
to correlate with levels of consciousness thus discriminating
between unaware and aware patients (Vanhaudenhuyse et al.,
2010; Fernández-Espejo et al., 2012).
RS, like the DOC,may benefit from characterization bymeans
of fMRI-BOLD resting state analysis. Undoubtedly different
mechanisms generate DOC and RS. Nevertheless, the covariance
between level of consciousness and DMN connectivity also in
anesthesia (Ramani, 2015), hypnosis (Vanhaudenhuyse et al.,
2014) and sleep (Horovitz et al., 2009) implies the DMN
connectivity of interest in relation to level of consciousness
regardless of cause. Resting state analysis could indicate to what
extent RS patients are conscious and demonstration of preserved
awareness would indirectly support RS being catatonia. It would
also imply feasibility of neuro-technological communication
(Owen et al., 2006; Evers and Sigman, 2013).
Interim Summary
Catatonia is from a phenomenological and clinical perspective
an adequate label of what has been labelled RS. The reluctance
to this attribution may be explained by unwillingness to
ECT in children in Sweden (Shorter, 2012) and the up until
recently prevailing view of catatonia as a sub group within
schizophrenia. Catatonia prompts ECT or benzodiazepines. To
our knowledge no RS patients have received such treatment.
Residual hesitance may be overcome by at test dose of
a benzodiazepine or by performing a PET examination
to objectify suggested reduced prefrontal metabolism.
Clinical observations implying preserved awareness may
be evaluated further by resting state network analysis. The
reconceptualization of catatonia invites to a re-evaluation
of RS, more so now than ever, and its correspondence to
catatonia.
Culture-Bound Psychogenesis Explains
the Regional Distribution of RS
Regardless of the relationship between catatonia and RS, the
question remains how to explain the regional distribution of RS.
Expressions of distress are constrained by brain function upon
which beliefs and expectations impact. Evolving and transpiring
within cultural contexts, beliefs and expectations readily serve as
vehicles of idioms of distress. Culture-bound psychogenesis, it will
be argued, may explain the regional distribution of RS. Genetic
or environmental factors are conceivable in accounting for the
regional distribution, nevertheless; such commendable analyses
are beyond the scope of this article.
Clinical Traditions
Differences in diagnostics and treatment across countries
conceivably supply explanations for the endemic distribution
of RS. Provided the condition is promptly reversed, patients
would not reach the prolonged stuporous state RS exhibits. This
hypothesis predicts the incidences of catatonia—and/or other
similar disorders—and RS to correspond.
In 2003–2005, the estimated annual incidence of RS was
2.8% in 0–17 year old asylum seekers. Catatonia incidence
has been examined in two pediatric and adolescent psychiatric
materials and found to be 0.6 and 5.5% respectively (Cohen et al.,
1999; Thakur et al., 2003). The general incidence in the young
population was estimated at 0.16% in Paris (Cohen et al., 1999).
Estimated RS incidence is thus comparable to that of catatonia in
psychiatric materials but does not correspond to that in a general
material.
This discrepancy could reflect the vulnerability refugees as a
group exhibit and the high incidence interpreted accordingly.
Similar incidences would then be expected in comparable
populations—in particular refugees populations—which, to our
knowledge, remains to be surveyed in this respect. However,
were the incidence of catatonia in young refugees in the vicinity
of 2.8%, it would most likely have been reported, and; thus,
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differences in clinical practice are not likely to account for the
regional distribution of RS. Possibly, however unlikely, other
diagnostic entities could obscure RS in other refugee populations.
Billing (2014, Personal Communication) proposed too liberal
diagnostic inclusion could explain the peak in incidence
2003–2005. However, this proposal does not explain the regional
distribution per se. Instead, it illustrates the importance of
perceiving a diagnosis as more than the label of a clinical entity.
It invites the discussion of the diagnosis as a culturally influenced
construct and an analysis of its application within a cultural
context.
Culture-Bound
Yap (1962), in order to unify and retain traditional nosology,
proposed the class ‘‘atypical culture-bound psychogenic
psychoses’’ (later culture-bound syndromes) on recognizing the
‘‘pathoplastic influence’’ effected by culture to generate in ‘‘exotic
psychoses’’. Consequently, Latah, Susto, Koro, Dhat etcetera,
were conceptualized as, and grouped among, the ‘‘reactive
psychoses (psychogenic reactions)’’ (Yap, 1967). By culture-
bound it was implied that ‘‘[w]ith respect to the psychogenic
reactions, significant etiological factors are commonly to be
found at the social and psychosocial level rather than the
anatomical and biochemical’’ (Yap, 1967).
Although transcultural differences in psychiatry are
controversial (Kleinman, 1987; Prince and Tcheng-Laroche,
1987; Keshavan, 2014; Ventriglio et al., 2015) they are evident;
the incidence, symptoms, course and outcomes in schizophrenia
(Myers, 2011); clinical presentation of depression and anxiety
(Kirmayer, 2001), and; symptoms, self-perception, help-seeking
behavior and treatment in relation to war trauma (Miller et al.,
2009; Hinton and Lewis-Fernández, 2010; Shannon et al., 2015)
vary across cultures. In recognition, all mental distress is, in
DSM-5, considered culturally framed and populations expected
to display culturally determined differences in communicating
distress as well as in relation to explanations of causality, coping-
methods and help-seeking behaviors (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Consequently, culture-bound syndromes
are recognized and grouped within the cultural concepts of
distress defined as ‘‘ways cultural groups experience, understand,
and communicate suffering, behavioral problems, or troubling
thoughts and emotions’’ (American Psychiatric Association,
2013).
By culture-bound we recognize the impact exerted by socio-
culturally transferable beliefs and expectations on an individual
or population.
Many consider dualism an out-dated metaphysical basis
for psychiatry (Shorter, 2006). In cognitive neuroscience the
connexion between psychology, brain physiology and behavior
is nevertheless indisputable and everyday life as well as clinical
experience informs of the relevance of psychological processes to
behavior. To demonstrate the impact of culture and context on
symptom generation and presentation we draw on an account of
psychogeninc illness (Shorter, 1992) exemplified by ‘‘La Grand
Hystérie’’, epidemic hysteria and suggestion. These phenomena
are presented to illustrate the likelihood of RS being culture-
bound.
“La Grande Hystérie”
Shorter, in an extensive analysis of the history of psychogenic
illness, explores the relationship between physicians, patients and
conceptions of disease throughout centuries (Shorter, 1992). In
essence, he argues that cultural context–in particular diagnostic
techniques, medical paradigms, familial expectation and social
roles–influences what symptoms are legitimate and illegitimate
by associating to them underlying organic disease for which the
patient cannot be blamed, and; that unconsciously, in response
to stress, trauma or suggestion, symptoms are assimilated from
the ‘‘symptom pool’’ of legitimate symptoms and perceived as
genuine indicators of an organic disorder or dysfunction by
patients and physicians alike.
In treating patients with ‘‘hystero-epilepsy’’ at La Salpêtrière
hospital in Paris, Jean-Martin Charcot developed a theory
asserting that hysteria was an inherited, life-long, disease of
the nervous system with sensory (headache, loss of sensation
etcetera) and motor (tremor, paralysis etcetera) stigmata
accompanied by reoccurring fits characterized by four phases
presenting in a law-like manner: (1) the epileptiod period;
(2) the ‘‘period of contortions and grande mouvements’’ during
which the patients flung themselves about, crying and adopting
improbable postures like ‘‘arc-de-cercles’’; (3) the period of
‘‘impassioned poses’’ like prayer, crucifixion etcetera; and
(4) a ‘‘terminal period’’ where anything could happen. Ovary
tenderness at debut of fits was considered pathognomonic as well
as hypnotisability.
Treatment—consisting of ‘‘metallotherapy’’ and hypnosis—
and patient demonstrations, attended by students, visiting
physicians, journalists and the general public, produced ‘‘a
climate of suggestion’’ prompting patients to exhibit symptoms
in accordance with the ‘‘laws of hysteria’’. Scientific and
journalistic reports paralleled the spread and increase of cases
with predicted symptomatology. Eventually patients were
referred from other continents.
On observing startle shock and suggestion by hypnosis
precipitating the symptoms, Charcot later came to recognize
psychological factors as possible inducers of hysteria. This
shift Shorter interprets as the beginning of the end for
‘‘Charcot’s Hysteria’’. No longer an organic disorder—and
patients less prone to unconsciously select and present
symptoms indicating a problem ‘‘merely in the head’’—the
incidence dropped. Also, Charcot’s successor, attributing
the ‘‘epidemic’’ to iatrogenic suggestion, prohibited mention
of hysteric symptoms in front of patients and ferociously
challenged those exhibiting fits. Babinski, a student of
Charcot’s—and the discoverer of a clinical procedure useful
in distinguishing hysteric from organic paralysis—later
characterized hysteria in La Salpêtrière as ‘‘any symptom
that could be induced by suggestion [understood as medical or
cultural] and abolished by persuasion [including hypnosis and
psychotherapy]’’.
‘‘La Grand Hystérie’’ illustrates how psychogenic symptoms
evolve over time, transpire epidemically and affect by suggestion.
According to Shorter, the content of the symptom pool
evolve constantly, through the continuous negotiation
between physicians and patients immersed in cultural
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context, and is reflected in ‘‘pathoplasticity’’, the changing
psychogenic symptomatology. Current negotiations are
affected in particular by media, and the contemporary
expressions—controversially—include chronic fatigue syndrome
and environmental hypersensitivity (Stewart, 1990; Shorter,
1992).
Epidemic Hysteria
Epidemic hysteria (Boss, 1997) of mass sociogenic illness—the
rapid spread of unconsciously exhibited symptoms indicative
of excitation, loss or alteration of neurological function
without corresponding etiology in a cohesive group—exhibit
contagious characteristics, and has been asserted, due to surface
heterogeneity, to represent an under-appreciated, social problem
(Bartholomew and Wessley, 2002).
Examples include regionally dispersed ‘‘dancing
mania’’—known as the St Vitus dance—reoccurring throughout
the Middle Ages; motor hysteria outbreaks in nunneries or, more
recently, boarding schools (reported from Malaysia during the
1980s), and; mass hysteria—often in poor working environment
and related to mysterious odors (Boss, 1997). Continuous
anxiety or stress in segregated highly controlled groups has been
suggested to engender dissociation and hyper-suggestibility
eliciting delusions reflecting the Zeitgeist, epidemic hysteria thus
mirroring its time (Bartholomew and Wessley, 2002).
Recent reports include mass psychogenic illness (n = 170)
attributed to toxic exposure at a high school (Jones et al.,
2000); an outbreak of conversion disorder (n = 5) among Amish
adolescent girls (Cassady et al., 2005), and; acute stridor (n = 12)
in a female cohort of students in preparation for national exams
(Powell et al., 2007).
Suggestion
Socio-cultural impact on individual psychogenic expressions
has also been studied. Patients present symptoms in relation
to social surroundings, iatrogenic suggestion (Fallik and
Sigal, 1971) and following hypnosis (Halligan et al., 2000).
Also, symptom attribution varies with ‘‘trendy diagnoses’’:
In 1985, most patients with environmental hypersensitivity
disorder (n = 50), also attributed their problems to food
and synthetics, in 1986 to Candida albicans, and in 1987
to chronic Epstein-Barr virus (Stewart, 1990). Contemporary
fixed illness attributions have been suggested to align with
media reports, and controversially, chronic fatigue syndrome,
myalgic encephalomyelitis and environmental hypersensitivity are
examples from our time (Shorter, 1992).
RS is Culture-Bound
Psychogenic symptom expression paralleling progression in
medicine and culture (Shorter, 1992; North, 2015), discrete
episodes of epidemic hysteria (Levy and Nail, 1993; Boss,
1997; Bartholomew and Wessley, 2002) and intra-individual
presentation as well as progression of psychogenic illness
attributions relating to trends (Stewart, 1990; Shorter, 1992)
suggest culture-bound psychogenesis to be a robust and
important phenomenon. The acknowledgment of transcultural
differences (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), idioms of
distress (Ventriglio et al., 2015) and varying psychogenic illness
presentation supply indirect evidence culture-bound transfer of
psychopathology and symptom induction by hypnosis (Halligan
et al., 2000) provide direct evidence.
Mass psychogenic illness, traditionally epidemic hysteria,
exhibit certain characteristics (Levy and Nail, 1993; Boss, 1997;
Bartholomew and Wessley, 2002). Highly segregated groups
where stress, control or obligations are evident and inescapable
are predisposed and historically in particular religious settings
are overrepresented. Female patients predominate. Patients
below 20 years of age are overrepresented. Epidemics involve
typical symptoms, including fatigue and unconsciousness,
without demonstrable organic lesions. Relapse is common.
‘‘Compensational’’ issues have been reported of importance.
Media reports are known to enable transmission of illness
behavior.
RS mostly afflicts individuals of the same ethnic group,
language community and previous, as well as present,
cultural context (Rydelius, 2006) in which psychological
and or physical trauma as well as stress are prevalent (Godani
et al., 2008). Helplessness and hopelessness—equivalents
of inescapability—are generally asserted (Bodegård, 2005a;
Lindberg and Sundelin, 2005). Uighurs early trust children with
high responsibility (Rydelius, 2006) something the predicaments
of migration and asylum seeking may reinforce creating more
of control and obligations. The male to female ratio is 2:3,
mean age 14.3 years old and relapses have occurred. Symptoms
imply a central nervous affliction, however, none have been
demonstrated. A secondary illness gain may be assumed, as
severe illness hypothetically generate in increased chances of
asylum approval. On a different level the seemingly unconscious
state may per se be perceived as a secondary illness gain
offering relief. The estimated peak in RS cases was paralleled
by extensive media reports, popularization and an infected
debate—regarding in particular etiology, malingering and level
of care—and involving, in a transparent way, also the medical
profession (Hacking, 2010) supplying ample opportunities for
the negotiation and transpiration of legitimate symptoms.
The RS endemic fails to demonstrate a clear index case (which
there nevertheless may have been), an identifiable trigger event
(although individual presentation sometimes is preceded by e.g.,
a negative asylum decision) and it is uncertain to which degree
individual cases have been in contact prior to presentation.
These factors are generally seen in epidemic hysteria
(Boss, 1997).
Not described in other parts of the world and overrepresented
in ethnic minorities from certain parts of the world, RS respects
national borders and to some extent, ethnicity and/or language
community. These peculiar circumstances are difficult to explain
without reference to culture and context and we therefore assert
RS to be culture-bound.
Psychogenesis
In the previous section the notion of psychogenesis was
inherent and served to transform culturally transpiring idioms
of distress into generation of corresponding symptoms. Such
neurological dysfunction in the absence of demonstrable organic
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lesion has been know to physicians since ancient times as
hysteria. Grouped either among conversion disorders (DSM-5)
or dissociative disorders (ICD-10), symptoms encompass loss,
excitation or alteration of motor and sensory functions,
including altered states of consciousness, sometimes in
conjunction. Symptoms are genuine, sometimes disabling,
and common–in one study functional and psychological
symptoms were found to account for 16% of diagnosis
in neurology units (Stone et al., 2010). Importantly, the
symptoms are also involuntary, a fact not consistently
recognized.
From Latin ‘‘hysterus’’, hysteria originally implied an etiology
involving dysfunction or displacement of the uterus. Charcot
recognized suggestion or psychogenic shock to precipitate
symptoms—treatable with hypnosis—and proposed abnormal or
absent ‘‘mental imagery’’ to result in corresponding neurological
dysfunctions (Shorter, 1992; Gelder, 2001). Janet, invoked
traumatic narrowing of attention with subsequent dissociation
and disintegration of mental processes creating unconscious
yet processed mental realms (Gelder, 2001). Breuer and Freud
(1956/1893) adopted this notion in their psychodynamic theory
of conversion in which negative emotions ensuing ‘‘psychical
trauma’’ were hypothesized to convert into symbolic physical
symptoms resulting in primary and secondary illness gain.
Invoking ‘‘a morbid condition of emotion, of idea and emotion,
or of idea alone’’ in pathogenesis, Reynolds (1869) appreciated
emotive as well as cognitive dysfunction.
The most commonly reported symptoms—psychogenic non-
epileptic seizures (PNES), loss of consciousness and motor
symptoms (Brown and Lewis-Fernández, 2011)—imitate organic
disorders. Prevalence is increased following brain injury (Eames,
1992), prior to debut of, and parallel to, epilepsy (Devinsky
et al., 2011), with depression, PTSD (Ballmaier and Schmidt,
2005), anxiety and borderline personality disorder (Brown and
Lewis-Fernández, 2011). Although transculturally understudied
(Brown and Lewis-Fernández, 2011), functional disorders have
been claimed to vary little in incidence and semiology across
cultures (Carota and Calabrese, 2014). Importantly, complex
behavior, such as pseudo-labor, Genser syndrome, anorexia
nervosa and catatonia, has been attributed to conversion
(Jensen, 1984; Lyman, 2004; Jiménez Gómez and Quintero,
2012; Shah et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2013) implicating
also higher order processes. Moreover, de facto organic
findings in conversion disorder (Ballmaier and Schmidt, 2005;
Vuilleumier, 2005, 2014; García-Campayo et al., 2009) indicate,
contrary to the traditional conception, the possibility of a
neurocognitive mechanism answering to symptom generation,
and conversion disorder thus being a phenomenon, also, of the
brain.
Reflecting the multitude of mechanisms and etiologies
suggested, current DSM and ICD nosology is ‘‘widely regarded
as unsatisfactory’’ (Gelder, 2001) in particular with regards
to clinical overlap between conversion, dissociation and
somatization (Brown and Lewis-Fernández, 2011; North,
2015), and mechanistic as well as etiological bias involving
unconscious mental states and psychological stress or trauma,
with undecided, little, or no empirical relation to symptoms
(Roelofs and Spinhoven, 2007; Brown and Lewis-Fernández,
2011). Although the DSM-5 criterion involving identification of
a specific psychological cause has been abandoned and functional
neurologic symptom disorder (FNSD) introduced as an alternate
term to conversion disorder (American Psychiatric Association,
2013), more extensive reclassification has been proposed (Brown
et al., 2007; North, 2015).
In the previous section culturally determined expectations
and beliefs were demonstrated of importance to symptom
generation of culture-bound phenomena (Stewart, 1990; Shorter,
1992; Levy and Nail, 1993; Boss, 1997; Hinton and Lewis-
Fernández, 2010; Medeiros De Bustos et al., 2014). Even
so, a dogmatic psychological approach has been asserted
‘‘misguided and unhelpful’’ (Edwards and Bhatia, 2012) as
psychological factors, particularly understood as trauma or
internal conflict, not consistently are supported clinically or
in epidemiological studies (Roelofs and Spinhoven, 2007;
Brown and Lewis-Fernández, 2011). Moreover, inorganic
genesis has been denied altogether (Slater, 1965) perhaps
signaling dualism to some an out-dated metaphysical basis
for psychiatry (Shorter, 2006). In cognitive neuroscience the
connexion between psychology, brain physiology and behavior
is nevertheless indisputable and everyday life as well as clinical
experience informs of the relevance of psychological processes to
behavior.
In general, the presupposition of physical symptoms
occurring unattended by demonstrable organic findings, where
there are strong evidence or presumptions that the symptoms are
linked to psychological factors, seems to force an unwarranted
and unfortunate mutually excluding, dichotomy creating a
divide between neurological and psychological mechanisms.
Either it is in the mind or, it is in the body. This starting
point is infertile and so, denying psychogenesis—understood
as implying psychological impact on symptom generation
and precipitation—altogether, is equally absurd as is the
opposite.
However, as the controversies regarding mechanisms and
etiologies indicate fundamental difficulties in conceiving of the
pathophysiology (Gelder, 2001; Roelofs and Spinhoven, 2007;
Brown and Lewis-Fernández, 2011; North, 2015), an analysis
of psychogenesis, relying on current nosology, is from the
outset likely to perpetuate previous unhelpful conceptions.
Ultimately, a model appreciating the impact of beliefs and
expectations in directing and generating symptoms is the
ambition. Consequently, although aspiring to neutrality, also
culture-bound psychogenesis should be considered preliminary
and any mechanistic analysis of symptom generation preferably
be unbiased even in relation to, although not inconsistent with,
psychological causation.
Relying on a framework of predictive coding, a mechanism
answering to the protean nature of phenomena attributed
to psychogenesis, we argue, may be attained. Importantly,
such a mechanism permits also organic genesis of symptoms.
Nevertheless, in relation to the present context—the notion of
culture-bound serving to explain the regional distribution of
RS—it should be emphasized that a description solely on the level
of the brain is unlikely to be successful.
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A PREDICTIVE CODING MODEL
The effect of expectations on biological systems has been shown
to be a decisive factor in both health and disease. The common
denominator may be found in the models of predictive coding as
a fundamental way the brain processes information. The general
idea that the models of the world harnessed within the brain
impact how we experience the world itself have been proposed
more than a hundred years ago by Helmholtz (Helmholtz, 1866;
Frith, 2007). Modern predictive coding theories suggest that
Bayesian inference describe these processes (Friston, 2005; Frith,
2007).
Conceptually, such predictive coding hypotheses suggest
that the brain constructs models of the world on different
hierarchical levels. The models also act as expectations or
predictors (priors) of the external and internal worlds. When
a signal reaches the brain in a primary sensory region it will
be compared with the priors, and if it does not match (in
that the expectations are different as compared to the signal)
it will produce an error signal. This error is proportional to
the difference between prior and input, and will be propagated
to the next hierarchical level where it is compared to priors
on the intermediate levels. If these priors fail to explain the
error signal it will continue its propagation to higher order
hierarchies. The error signal may be used to change the priors
or models of the world. However, the priors and the models
may also change the way input is processed or perceived. Thus,
a percept is determined both by the input and by the model.
In Bayesian terms the models are conceptualized as priors and
input as observation while the percept (thus dependent on
both the prior and the observation) is often referred to as the
posterior.
Research on placebo and nocebo treatment effects has
suggested that expectation processes are crucially involved in the
underlying mechanism (Petrovic et al., 2010; Büchel et al., 2014).
For any given treatment, expectations about its effect will be
built up in the subject or the patient. Verbal information about
the effectiveness of the treatment is one source of information
affecting the expectations. Other contextual factors in treatment
may also change the expectations—including how invasive
the treatment is (e.g., injections seems to be more effective
than giving a pill). Importantly, also low-level conditioning
effects are important for determining the expectation effect
(Amanzio and Benedetti, 1999; Jensen et al., 2012, 2015), albeit
in lower levels of the hierarchical network. Thus, placebo
effects are not dependent on conscious mechanism. In more
formal terms all these sources of information processing
change the priors of the brain in different hierarchical
levels, all of which are thought to contribute to the placebo
effect.
The underlying neural mechanism of the placebo effect
has mostly been studies with regards to pain, where also the
underlying opioid system has been proposed of importance
(Petrovic et al., 2002; Zubieta et al., 2005; Wager et al., 2007).
Further, placebo treatment has been suggested to change the
neural processing underlying emotions (Petrovic et al., 2005)
depression (Mayberg et al., 2002) and Parkinson’s disease
(de la Fuente-Fernández et al., 2001). Moreover, similar
manipulations of expectations have been shown to change how
visual stimuli are processed (Sterzer et al., 2008; Schmack et al.,
2013) in line with the idea that any type of perception is perceived
in relation to the expectations of the systems.
How profoundly can expectation change the experience of the
world? It has been suggested that extremely powerful priors are
essentially the cause of hallucinations and delusions in psychosis
(Frith, 2007; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams et al., 2013). In line
with this idea, manipulations of higher order expectations have
shown that delusion prone individuals will experience the world
more in line with those expectations (Schmack et al., 2013; Teufel
et al., 2015).
A common theme, apart from the involvement of
expectations, is dopamine system involvement in different
aspects of placebo responses (de la Fuente-Fernández et al.,
2001; Scott et al., 2008). As a main contributor also in psychosis,
it may have a specific role in the balance between priors and
observation.
Thus, in a predictive coding framework, priors change the way
information is processed, even to the extent that delusions may
arise in realms beyond control and awareness. Moreover, certain
personality traits, such as delusion proneness, may explain why
some individuals are more likely to develop pathogenic priors.
Interestingly, it has furthermore been suggested that
functional sensory or motor symptoms in somatization and
conversion disorder may be initiated and maintained by strong,
although not necessarily conscious, priors (Edwards et al.,
2012). In the sensory domain, the results of strong priors
are well formed precepts, which may or may not be accurate
representations of the world. In the motor domain, strong priors
will elicit motor behavior, or its absence, through top-down
influence on motor reflex arcs which, involuntarily generated, is
perceived as abnormal behavior and symptoms of a neurological
disorder.
The interoceptive system has been proposed to be likewise
affected by expectation (Barrett and Simmons, 2015). Thus, the
experienced bodily state will be determined not only by input
from different interoceptive channels but also by expectations
regarding the state itself. In particular, homeostatic cues from
the hormonal, immune, metabolic and autonomic nervous
systems have been suggested to generate error signals resulting
in either bottom-up adjustment of predictions, or, top-down
influence over physiological homeostasis (Seth, 2013; Barrett and
Simmons, 2015). Thus, by predictive coding, the brain not only
acquires and adjusts to homeostatically relevant information; it
also orchestrates the adaption of the organism in relation to
physiological needs instructed by priors. In particular, according
to the model, the latter occurs in parts of the system where
priors are strong and observations weak or imprecise, a balance
likely to be of importance in homeostatic systems relying on
fixed parameters to maintain the organism within a physiological
state.
It is hypothesized (Seth, 2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015)
that not only basic homeostasis—converging particularly on
the anterior insular cortex (AIC)—but also higher order self-
related representations of emotion, agency, self-narration and
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body-ownership—subserved in ACC, posterior ventromedial
PFC, posterior OFC—and supporting conscious self-perception
and attentional control, are implicated in a wider interoceptive
predictive coding system instantiated by the brain. Through
the multisensory representation of in particular homeostatically
relevant predictions distributed in the AIC andACC,modulation
of attentional, sensory and behavioral responses, is attained and
transmitted in the wider system. Through these channels higher
order functions may be recruited in minimizing prediction error
by adjusting priors or instructing behavior on the conscious level.
Thus, by engaging physiological control mechanisms at
the core of the organism, as well as attentional, sensory and
behavioral responses also under the influence of higher cognitive
processing, a powerful and integrated system answering to
ecological needs of the organism is running, orchestrated within
a predictive coding framework, in the brain.
Here we propose that a multitude of factors—psychological
and or physical trauma, helplessness and hopelessness, familial
expectations and obligations, the predicaments of migration
and asylum seeking, including negative expectations regarding
chances of obtaining a PRP—are crucial for setting inner priors
of the interoceptive system to extreme levels in predisposed
individuals. These priors may include (conscious or non-
conscious) models untenable for bodily function under massive
external stress thus eliciting a vulnerable state evolving into RS.
A situation of extreme stress and negative prospects (nocebo)
is under normal circumstances not detrimental as interoceptive
and exteroceptive input generates prediction errors driving
physiological and behavioral change aimed at overcoming the
situation. On the contrary, when strong priors are set ‘‘low’’, due
to previous experience projecting to the present, the same nocebo
situation will only accord with the predictions and adjustment
will be absent thus perpetuating negative predictions with
corresponding physiological, attentional, sensory and behavioral
consequences.
Moreover, even if the interoceptive and exteroceptive input
improve, prediction error may—provided priors are sufficiently
strong, or sensory input imprecise—drive adjustment not of
the model, but instead towards the prediction, in which case
homeostatic mechanisms are directed top-down to attain a
physiological state in correspondence with the prediction so as
to minimize prediction error. The corresponding percept of the
internal state represented in the AIC and the ACC is through the
wider system responsible for modulation of cognitive, emotive
and behavioral processes thus unlocking the full potential of
the organism’s predictive capacity resulting also in a mind-set
corresponding to the prediction.
At this stage, negative predictions having generalized in
higher and lower levels of the hierarchy, and physiological
systems threatening homeostasis, the organism, at some point,
adopts a behavior which elicits support from its surroundings;
an idiom of distress.
Within a predictive coding framework this may be interpreted
either as an attempt at minimizing prediction error by projecting
the interocepted state onto the world as to affect it to accord with
the prediction, in which case the intended result is the prevention
of help from the surrounding; or, as a change in strategy and
if so presumably driven by another set of priors corresponding
to a rescue attempt from an inexorably escalating development.
Interestingly, Seth (2013) finds support for an extended Bayesian
framework encompassing also social interaction. Drawing on
evidence from psychosis, behavior such as loss or alteration of
general function may be as powerful as a delusion. Importantly,
the response from the surrounding may on this hypothesis
not only contribute to perpetuation of an illness-state but also
possibly hold the key to its resolve.
We thus propose that RS may be conceived within a
predictive coding framework, as a condition where predisposing
and contextual factors generate in negative expectations and
beliefs instantiated in fixed priors, which drives homeostatic
and behavioral effects as well as self-perception, towards the
prediction, minimizing prediction error, however at the cost
of pushing the physiological, cognitive and emotional state
further away from that which sustains life. The resulting
behavior—described in terms of apathy, RS or catatonia—may
be interpreted as, an outwardly broadcasted self-representation
functioning as to minimize prediction error by extending also
into the world the interocepted state in order to affect it
accordingly, or, as a behavior serving to elicit support from the
surrounding. In either case, the particular behavior, intended
for a specific purpose, is conceivably one corresponding to
culturally sanctioned expectations of what that behavior entails.
Consequently, culture-bound reaction patterns are predicted by
the model.
DISCUSSION
With regards to the phenomenon referred to as RS, our analysis
has suggested catatonia to supply the best fit with clinical
data, culture-bound psychogenesis to account for the regional
distribution and predictive coding to supply a promising context
in which to express a mechanistic model. We have purposely
omitted to develop an account of the neural components
instantiating the Bayesian machinery in the brain and instead
direct the reader to recent conceptualizations (Edwards et al.,
2012; Seth, 2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015).
Our analysis has lead us to a proposal that catatonia in
certain instances may be culture-bound, which, considering the
organic presentation of the disorder and its historical relation
to schizophrenia, is highly controversial. Nevertheless, the
current conception of catatonia as a neuropsychiatric syndrome
associated with systemic illness (Fink et al., 2015) implies the
possibility of a heterogeneous etiology.
Relatedly, an analysis of catatonia and Parkinson’s
disease—conceived as movement disorders—at the level of
the brain, has been suggested should invoke a ‘‘principle of
double way’’, asserting that ‘‘function of the same anatomical
apparatus may be disturbed by both organic lesions and
psychological alterations’’. Hypothetically, the same motor
loop may be abnormally affected either by psychological
(cortical) top-down regulation, or, by aberrant (subcortical)
bottom-up regulation illustrated by akinetic catatonia and
Parkinson’s disease functionally affecting the same ‘‘motor
loop’’, however, by different mechanisms originating in the
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orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the substantia nigra respectively
(Northoff, 2002). Even though this proposal is not set in a
predictive coding framework, it may be reinterpreted in relation
to motor predictions and proprioceptive input generating error
signals eliciting top-down directed (absence of) movement
or bottom-up adjustments of predictions, both converging
on intermediate levels of the hierarchy and eliciting motor
symptoms in accordance with a recent proposal by Edwards et al.
(2012).
Catatonia has further been conceived of as a disorder resulting
from abnormal emotional processing. Catatonic patients (n = 10)
exhibited altered activity in mOFC and mPFC as well as
abnormal orbitofrontal and premotor/motor cortical functional
connectivity on exposure to negative emotional images and
compared to psychiatric and healthy controls. Also, catatonic
behavioral and affective symptoms correlated with deactivation
in OFC whereas motor symptoms correlated with mPFC
activation (Northoff et al., 2004). It was suggested that abnormal
emotional processing and deactivation of OFC—through
connections to the basal nucleus of amygdala implicated in
affective inhibition by cognitive control—result in subsequent
altered activity in medial prefrontal and premotor/motor
function generating affective, behavioral and motor symptoms
of catatonia. Response to anxiolytic drugs and self-report of
overwhelming uncontrollable emotions—both notably reported
also in RS (Bodegård, 2005b; Engström, 2013)—is taken to
support the hypothesis (Northoff et al., 2004). Supplying an
adequate fit with the data, this hypothesis nevertheless lacks
in sufficient precision to allow anything but a very general
reconceptualization within a predictive coding framework
amounting to an analysis involving inadequate priors generating
prediction errors the system adapts to by actions on intermediate
levels involving lower as well as higher processing nevertheless
below the conscious level.
An alternate exploration of catatonia recognizes connexion
with anxiety or fear states on the basis of immediate
treatment response to anxiolytics drugs, taken to support a
limbic system pathophysiology (Daniels, 2009). Deficits in
akinetic catatonia, such as stupor, mutism and negativism, are
however consistent also with an underlying motivational deficit
suggesting that suppression of incentive salience (‘‘wanting’’;
Berridge and Robinson, 2003), mediated in dopaminergic
mesolimbic structures projecting into prefrontal areas could
account for core symptoms. Dopamine, of importance in placebo
(Scott et al., 2008) and delusions (Adams et al., 2013) may
interplay in shifting the balance between prior and observation
also generating catatonic symptoms in relation to predictions.
Other than reconceptualizations of previous findings
complying with a Bayesian analysis, there are clinical evidence
of a multifactorial genesis involving also psychogenic generation
of catatonia. Case-reports attributing catatonia to conversion
(Jensen, 1984; Shah et al., 2012) and catatonia (n = 10) as well as
conversion (n = 5) successfully confirmed through a common
method of Amytal interviewing (Iserson, 1980) are found in
support. Moreover, catatonic presentation varying throughout
history (Shorter, 2006, 2012) attributes to it a characteristic
generally considered a hallmark of conversion disorder and
Shorter (2012) asserts ‘‘It is important to understand that
cultural suggestion can cause patients to present catatonic
symptoms in some epochs, but not in others, whereas changes
in diagnostic fashion determine whether physicians make the
diagnosis or not’’. Thus, it does not seem unlikely that the brain,
influenced by ‘‘cultural suggestion’’, could generate catatonic
symptoms and the model here proposed supply a mechanistic
account of how this could be instantiated.
Pertaining to RS, there are, as we have here demonstrated,
indications that mandate the assertion equating RS with
catatonia. Apart from clinical characteristics, in particular
reports of normalization in response to midazolam, implies
this hypothesis should be evaluated and we have suggested
means thereto. As for the regional distribution, considered as
a hypothesis, it is difficult to test. In different parts of science,
however, different truth-criteria are manifest and from the
general point of view, broader involvement in this issue, and in
particular an epidemiological effort, is much needed.
Other than treatment already routinely offered in
catatonia—which is reported safe and efficient, also in children
adolescents—our model predicts no magic bullet. On the
contrary, if fixed predictions—laid down by previous experience
projecting into the present, in order to tell the future—generate
in prediction error denial, with subsequent drive in homeostatic
and higher level systems, towards the perpetuation of those
malicious predictions, by arranging the inner and outer world so
as to accord therewith, the situation indeed seems desperate.
Nevertheless, on the hypothesis that the behavior
characterizing RS is a social extension of interoceptive
predictions, which serves to either sound the alarm or perpetuate
inappropriate priors, the behavioral pattern represents on some
level a strategy selected in a social context. (Which is not to say
it is in any way voluntary). If this line of reasoning is correct,
which indeed is implied by the phenomenon respecting barriers
pertaining to language, culture, ethnicity and national borders,
measures aimed at pre-empting the unfortunate strategy should
be enforced. Certainly, a deepened understanding of the history,
culture and situation of risk groups individuals would be
necessary in order to reach out to these individuals.
The appeal to culture-bound psychopathology raises an
ethical dilemma. The argument we have presented, according
to which cultural sanctioning contributes to the generation of
specific kinds of behavioral patterns, implies that by offering
treatment, to which there is no alternative, we are also, on
another level, causing new cases.
CONCLUSION
The regional distribution and the prevalence of RS are
challenging to explain. Firstly, we have tried to establish that RS
represents a disorder previously described. Historical accounts
demonstrate that so is the case. We find no reason to ascribe to
this phenomenon a novel diagnostic entity.
Secondly, bearing this in mind, the diagnostic fit to known
disorders and hypotheses previously put forward have been
evaluated. We have argued catatonia to supply the best fit and
suggested means of examining this hypothesis in accordance
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with clinical practise and by neuroimaging. Catatonia, recently
reconceptualized, amounts to a phenomenological description
of a clinical entity for which there presumably can be different
causes.
Thirdly, the regional distribution, we have argued, is best
explained by perceiving RS as culture-bound. Importantly, this
does not preclude other factors to interplay in pathogenesis.
On the contrary, individual predisposition, traumatization,
contextual factors as well as culturally sanctioned beliefs and
expectations, may all be involved.
Lastly, we have provided a predictive coding model of RS.
On the basis of extreme priors, fixed by previous experiences,
the percept of the inner and outer world is stable and
skewed. Consequently, error signal minimization is directed
towards effecting the inner and outer worlds to accord with
the predictions which unharnesses homeostatic and behavioral
responses with that objective. This includes, on a social extension,
the projection of a culturally sanctioned idiom of distress also
interpretable in a predictive coding framework. Accommodating
an extensive multilevel involvement of homeostatic, cognitive
and emotional systems with deep impact on behavior influenced
by cultural expectations, this analysis is compatible with RS being
catatonia, culture-bound.
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